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CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES: A NORTH DAKOTA LOOK AT A
NATIONWIDE PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug abuse in America has reached such epidemic propor-
tions that it has been characterized as "one of the major social evils
of our time."' Today drugs affect virtually every "nationality,
race, and economic level."2 Furthermore, the problem is no
longer confined to major cities and selected states, but has "mani-
fested itself in every [community and] State in the Union."' Legis-
latures are becoming increasingly concerned with the societal
injury arising from narcotics and other addictive drugs. In an
effort to suppress the problem, and in response to a heightened
community interest, the North Dakota Legislature has promul-
gated comprehensive statutes designed to combat the manufac-
ture, sale, use and possession of controlled substances.4
The concept of "possession" has been a major source of con-
troversy in criminal proceedings and continues to be a most
obscure legal tenet.' Criminalizing the possession of controlled
1. State v. Cleppe, 635 P.2d 435, 439 (Wash. 1981).
2. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 2 (1988).
3. Id.
4. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-29.2-01 to -05 (1991) and 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 399
(authorizing wiretapping and eavesdropping devices in felony narcotics actions); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 29-31.1-01 to -10 (1991) (permitting the disposition of forfeitable property
which has been seized by a law enforcement agency); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-10.2-01 to
-06 (1991) (providing for the impaneling of a grand jury in North Dakota which has the
jurisdiction to investigate and indict for offenses relating to "organized crime"). Cf N.D.
CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23 (1991). This section provides, in pertinent part:
1. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
willfully, as defined in section 12.1-02-02, manufacture, deliver, or possess
with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance ....
2. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
willfully, as defined in section 12.1-02-02, create, deliver, or possess with
intent to deliver, a counterfeit substance ....
3. It is unlawful for any person to willfully, as defined in section 12.1-02-02,
possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly
from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise
authorized by this chapter ....
Id. (emphasis supplied).
5. Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics
Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751, 751 (1972). The term "possession" is
frequently utilized in the context of criminal law without definition. WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2, at 201 (2d ed. 1986). This may be a reflection of
the fact that word is " 'a common term used in everyday conversation that has not acquired
any artful meaning.'" Id. (quoting Kramer v. United States, 408 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir.
1969)). State statutes employ the word "possession" in a vacuum; doing so does little to
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substances permits the arrest and conviction of an individual
before the prohibited drug is actually used or sold.6 Traditionally,
the imposition of criminal liability for possession was limited to sit-
uations where actual possession existed.7 Today, as a matter of
public policy, courts utilize a broader interpretation of what con-
stitutes possession, thereby extending the definition to include
constructive possession."
The proscription of possession serves as a more efficient means
of facilitating law enforcement, because possession of a narcotic is
generally easier to prove than its use or sale.9 The doctrine of con-
structive possession furthers this effort by establishing "a legal fic-
tion, a pragmatic construct [designed] to deal with the realities of
criminal law enforcement."' 10 It does so by significantly broaden-
ing the application of possession to include situations in which
bona fide physical control of a substance cannot be directly
proven, but a strong inference exists that the defendant actually
possessed the substance at one time and continued to exercise
"dominion and control over it.""
A primary source of confusion surrounding constructive pos-
session is that the term "possession" has many nuances of mean-
describe the offense. Douglas B. King, Note, Possession of Dangerous Drugs in Indiana, 8
IND. L. REV. 690, 690 (1975). Instead, it is left to the judiciary to give the language
meaning. Id. Consequently, "lack of legislative guidance" has been responsible for some of
the confusion surrounding the term. Id.
6. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 753-54.
7. See Tyler v. Commonwealth, 91 S.E. 171, 172 (Va. 1917) (finding constructive
possession to be an insufficient basis for the imposition of criminal liability); see infra note
10 for definitions of actual and constructive possession.
8. See, e.g., State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d 651, 655 (N.D. 1989) (holding that the
requirement of possession can be fulfilled in a narcotics conviction by an affirmative
showing of either actual or constructive possession).
9. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 753-54.
10. Commonwealth v. Aviles, No. 1650, 1991 WL 285792, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
It has been said that "flunctionally, actual possession is possession which exists as a matter
of fact. Constructive possession is a legal fiction used by courts to find possession in
situations where it does not in fact exist, but where they nevertheless want an individual to
acquire the legal status of a possessor." Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 761-62. See
Jacobson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 46 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn. 1951) (a civil action to
recover for loss caused by the theft of an automobile in which the court found the existence
of constructive possession to be "wholly in contemplation of law without possession in
fact."); State v. Florine, 226 N.w.2d 609,610 (Minn. 1975). The police in Florine discovered
narcotics in a notebook that was located on the back seat of an unlocked, abandoned
vehicle. Id. The notebook bore the defendant's name, and several documents in the
vehicle belonged to the defendant. Id. The defendant was convicted of possession despite
the fact that the vehicle did not belong to him and others had ready access to it. Id. The
Florine court held that, although the defendant did not have exclusive possession of the
automobile in which the narcotics were found, the evidence was sufficient to "support an
inference that the defendant at one time had [actual] physical possession" of the
contraband. Id. at 611. Moreover, the court indicated that the defendant did not
relinquish his possessory interest in the substance, but rather retained the right to control
the drugs until the time of the arrest. Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611.
11. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Minn. 1975).
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ing.12  Furthermore, the variety of factual contexts in which
possession is applied renders the word incapable of an exacting
definition and has provided the fuel for debate in the legal com-
munity.' 3 It has been suggested that the term "possession" is
ambiguous because it is frequently used by courts and scholars to
describe both actual possession and constructive possession.
1 4
Drawing a distinct line between actual and constructive possession
is difficult because the terms so embody one another that it is
nearly impossible to pinpoint where one begins and the other
ends. 15 In its broadest sense, possession is simply that evidence
which in its totality enables a reasonable person to conclude that a
sufficient enough relationship exists between an individual and the
property in question.' 6 Hence, when drawing an analytical dis-
tinction between actual and constructive possession, it is the rela-
tionship between the individual and the particular property which
must be scrutinized. 17 Actual possession is an actual physical hold-
ing of the property, consisting of the capacity to control it coupled
with an intent to do so.' Constructive possession also consists of
the capacity and the intent to control such property, but actual
physical control is absent.' 9
12. Jacobson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 46 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1951).
13. Id. The court noted:
Ambiguity in the meaning of the word possession dates from the
introduction into the law of the concept of constructive possession. Disputes as
to the meaning of possession stem either from an inadvertent disregard of the
origin and scope of the constructive-possession concept or from a placing of the
word possession in a context which creates or leaves a doubt as to whether
actual-namely, possession in its ordinary or original sense or constructive
possession is meant. It would seem that an understanding of the inception of the
term constructive possession would eliminate any ambiguity in the meaning of
possession ....
Id. at 871 (emphasis in original).
14. See National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914).
15. Stead, 232 U.S. at 67. Stead, although not a narcotics case, stated that "both in
common speech and in legal terminology, there is no word more ambiguous in its meaning
than [p]ossession." Id. See State v. Larson, 274 N.W.2d 884, 886 (N.D. 1979) (Burdick, S. Ct.
Comm'r, concurring specially) (noting that cases in which actual or exclusive possession are
at issue pose little difficulty); United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(finding the difficulty of the doctrine of constructive possession to be based on its
imprecision); Commonwealth v. Aviles, No. 1650, 1991 WL 285792, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (acknowledging the difficulty of applying tests for determining constructive
possession which are logical and helpful in the abstract to actual factual situations); United
States v. Holland, 445 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Tamm, J., concurring) (describing
judicial decisions in the area of constructive possession as establishing "ill-defined
guidelines," built on "obscure reasoning," suggesting "judicial subjectivity" the result being
the achievement of a particular outcome rather than providing a "workable index of
objective standards").
16. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 758.
17. Id.
18. Id. at n.20.
19. See Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 889 (1961); People v. Rumley, 222 P.2d 913, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
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This Note examines the application of the doctrine of con-
structive possession, insofar as it relates to the possession of con-
trolled substances, in an effort to provide North Dakota
practitioners with an analysis of the current state of the law. Addi-
tionally, this Note will provide guidance in dealing with the per-
plexing issue of constructive possession in light of recent
legislation which significantly altered North Dakota's criminal pos-
session statute.2 0 Finally, evidentiary requirements held disposi-
tive by courts in support of a finding of possession, where it did not
exist in fact, will be examined.
II. HISTORY OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENT
As far back as 1808, constructive possession served as a viable
doctrine within the context of admiralty, debtor-creditor, and
property law.2 1 Larceny cases, however, offer some of the earliest
applications and discussions of the doctrine within the criminal
context.22 In fact, the doctrine's inception has been traced by one
court to an action rooted in larceny:
At common law, the idea developed that for larceny there
must be a trespass, a taking from the possession of
another without his consent. A modification of this idea
emerged from the problem of whether a servant had cus-
20. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(3) (1991). When North Dakota adopted the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act in 1971, it included the mens rea requirement of
"knowingly or intentionally" as set forth in the Federal Controlled Substances Act. See
1971 N.D. Laws ch 235 § 23(3). As a result of the 1975 overhaul of the North Dakota
Criminal Code [Title 12.1], mention of a mens rea requirement within the narcotics
possession statute was omitted. See 1975 N.D. Laws ch. 106. In 1989, § 19-03.1-23(3) was
amended to include the mens rea requirement of "willfully," defined in § 12.1-02-02 as
conduct which is intentional, knowing or reckless. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (1985
and Supp. 1991). See also 1971 N.D. Laws ch. 235 § 23; 1973 N.D. Laws ch. 199 §§ 1, 2;
1975 N.D. Laws ch. 106 § 168; 1975 N.D. Laws ch. 110 §§ 9 to 11; 1979 N.D. Laws ch. 172
§ 28; 1979 N.D. Laws ch. 187 § 29; 1979 N.D. Laws ch. 287 § 4; 1983 N.D. Laws ch. 255 § 1;
1989 N.D. Laws ch. 267 § 1 (indicating the various amendments to § 19-03.1-23(3)).
21. See generally The Gran Para, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 497, 500 (1825) (in an action for
execution for property where a court of admiralty had parted with possession of the
property, the court found that any remedy to be sought had to rest on grounds of actual or
constructive possession); Leonard v. Neale, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 338 (D.C. Cir. 1806) (an action
founded in debtor-creditor law where law enforcement officials held property in trust for
creditors pursuant to a replevy order); Beggs v. Thompson, 2 Ohio 95 (1825) (an action
based on the adjudication of real property requiring the plaintiff to have actual or
constructive possession of the property in question in order to maintain the action).
22. See United States v. Holland, 26 F. Cas. 343, 345 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y 1843) (No.
15,378) (holding that in order to constitute larceny there must be either an actual or
constructive taking of the object); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 73 N.E. 852, 853 (Mass.
1905) (finding the requirement of actual or constructive possession to be a necessary
element of larceny); Jackson v. State, 11 Ohio St. 104 (1860) (involving an action based in
larceny where neither actual nor constructive possession was shown).
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tody or possession of goods delivered to him by his master
where the goods were to remain in the master's house or
his personal presence. To solve this problem, a statute
was enacted which provided that when chattels were
delivered to a servant by his master and the servant con-
verted them, it should be a felony. This statute was
strictly construed by the courts so that when a master
delivered money to a servant to carry off the premises
and the servant converted it, he was not guilty of commit-
ting a felony. Thereafter, . . . the court finally remedied
the situation by introducing a new concept: Because of
the status of master and servant, the master had construc-
tive possession even where the last vestige of actual pos-
session or physical control by the master has been
eliminated; as a result, a servant who was to leave the
premises with money delivered to him by his master and
who converted the money was guilty of larceny since he
only had custody and not possession. The courts resorted
to the fiction of constructive possession to expand the defi-
nition of possession in a servant-and-master relationship,
thereby preventing injustice. 3
In the doctrine's early development, although acknowledging
that constructive possession was enough to create civil liability,
some courts deemed it to be an insufficient basis for the imposition
of criminal liability.24 It has been generally agreed that exclusive
control over and knowing possession of the stolen item are essen-
tial elements for a larceny conviction. 5
In State v. Drew, 6 stolen goods were found in the home
23. Jacobson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 46 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn. 1951) (emphasis
in original) (footnotes omitted).
24. Tyler v. Commonwealth, 91 S.E. 171, 173 (Va. 1917). The court held:
'[Clonstructive possession, like constructive notice or knowledge,. though
sufficient to create a civil liability, is not sufficient to hold [a defendant] to a
criminal charge. He can only be required to account for the [properties] which
he actually and knowingly possessed .... If [the contraband is] found upon
premises owned or occupied as well by others as himself, or in a place to which
others had equal facility and right of access, there seems no good reason why he,
rather than they, should be charged upon this evidence alone.'
Id. at 172 (citing 3 Greenleaf, Ev. § 33).
25. See, e.g., State v. Drew, 78 S.W. 594 (Mo. 1904). "[T]o raise the presumption of
guilt from the possession of the fruits of the crime by the ... (accused], it is necessary that
they be found in his exclusive possession."' Id. at 595 (quoting State v. Castor, 5 S.W. 906
(Mo. 1887)). An accused "can only be required to account for the possession of things which
he actually and knowingly possessed." Id.
26. 78 S.W. 594 (Mo. 1904).
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where the accused and his family lived.2 7 The court held that the
mere fact that the stolen goods were found in the house, without
more, did not amount to sufficient evidence to support a finding of
guilt. 28 This was especially true when the possession of the stolen
goods could readily, with equal right, be attributed to members of
the family domicile other than the defendant. 29 Hence, mere con-
structive possession, without establishing knowledge or assent, did
not justify a finding of guilt.30
B. DEVELOPMENT DURING PROHIBITION
1. Early Definition of Constructive Possession
In the 1920s, courts in a number of jurisdictions began to
expand the scope of their criminal possession statutes by adopting
the doctrine of constructive possession.3 ' Some of the earliest
reported cases in which actual possession was not a prerequisite to
obtaining a conviction of criminal possession of a controlled sub-
stance involved intoxicating liquors.32
In People v. Vander Heide,33 the defendant was found guilty
of possession of liquor contained in trunks that were in the actual
27. State v. Drew, 78 S.W. 594, 594 (Mo. 1904). The prosecuting witness testified that
the general merchandise store which he owned was broken into and burglarized. Id.
Shoes, tobacco, meat and other miscellaneous goods were taken. Id. Upon a search of the
defendant's residence by the police, some of the stolen items were found in a locked trunk
and unlocked bureau drawer. Id. at 595. The defendant, however, was not present at the
time of the search. Id. at 596.
28. Id. at 596.
29. Id. There was no evidence presented that the defendant had actual knowledge of
the existence of the goods found in his home. Id. The court recognized that his daughter or
wife could have readily stolen the items. Id. The court held that under circumstances
where the prosecution was unable to demonstrate an affirmative showing of a conscious
possession on the part of an accused, the result could readily lead to punishing the innocent
for the acts of the guilty. Id. Without an affirmative showing of an actual, exclusive, and
conscious possession, the court refused to find that the act of "possession," for which the law
imposed liability, existed. Id.
30. Drew, 78 S.W. at 596. See State v. Castor, 5 S.W. 906 (Mo. 1887). Castor involved a
larceny conviction where the evidence showed that stolen property was found in the
defendant's trunk, to which he and others had access. Id. at 907. Upon arrest, the
defendant professed his innocence and denied having any knowledge of the goods
contained in the trunk. Id. at 908. The court held that such possession was not sufficient to
sustain a guilty verdict, as an accused could only be required to account for that which he
knowingly possessed. Id. at 909. Additionally, the court found that such possession will give
rise to a criminal offense only where the possession was exclusive and unexplained. Id.
31. See Reynolds v. State, 111 So. 285, 286 (Fla. 1926) (an "actual manucaption" of
liquor is not required to constitute possession, nor is it necessary that it actually be found on
the accused's person); People v. Vander Heide, 178 N.W. 78, 81 (Mich. 1920) (holding that
possession is not limited to "manual touch or personal custody"); State v. Parent, 212 P.
1061, 1062 (Wash. 1923) (finding that a right to immediate, actual possession will suffice);
State v. Spillman, 188 P. 915, 917 (Wash. 1920) (stating that one may be guilty of possession
without having an actual possession of the proscribed item).
32. See, e.g., State v. Parent, 212 P. 1061 (Wash. 1923).
33. 178 N.W. 78 (Mich. 1920).
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possession of another.3 4 Constructive possession was found
because the defendant had passenger baggage checks on his per-
son which corresponded to the trunks where the liquor was
stored.35 The court held that actual possession of the baggage
checks constituted prima facie evidence of ownership, right to pos-
session, and control.36 Finding constructive possession to be suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction, the court determined that possession
in such circumstances was not restricted to merely "manual touch
or personal custody."
37
In State v. Parent,38 the defendant was the proprietor of an
inn who, with an employee, was charged with the crime of unlaw-
ful possession of intoxicating liquor.39 Upon arrival at the inn,
police found the defendant's employees and a dozen or so other
individuals gathered inside.4° Approximately six of them, all cus-
tomers, were seated at a table with glasses containing alcohol in
front of them.4 1 A further search of the premises revealed a bottle
of alcohol located in a pantry that was connected to the kitchen.42
The defendant was working in the pantry at the time the police
arrived and discovered the alcohol. 43 At trial, he denied knowl-
edge of the alcohol found on the premises.44 He testified that
when the police arrived, "there were six employees on the prem-
ises, all of whom had access" to the areas where the alcohol was
discovered.45 The Parent court found that possession could be
constructive, as well as actual.46 The court went on to hold that
possession meant simply owning or having a thing under one's
influence so that actual direction over it could be exercised.47
Acknowledging that no actual possession existed, the court con-
34. People v. Vander Heide, 178 N.W. 78, 80 (Mich. 1920).
35. Id. Although not expressly requiring knowledge to be an element of the offense,
evidence that the defendant knew of the contents of the trunks was clear. Id.
36. Id. Such evidentiary factors indicated an ability or capacity to possess the
contraband. Id.
37. Id. at 81.
38. 212 P. 1061 (Wash. 1923).





44. Parent, 212 P. at 1061.
45. Id. at 1061-62. The defendant testified that, prior to the arrival of the police, a
number of "employees had walked back and forth from the pantry to the dining room." Id.
Since others had equal opportunity and access to the contraband, the defendant argued
that any presumption of possession from ownership of the premises was sufficiently
rebutted. Id.
46. Id. at 1062.
47. Id.
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jured a form of constructive possession.48 It stated that the posses-
sion supporting the conviction in this case was possession in law.49
The fact that the defendant had a proprietary interest in the
premises gave him the right to immediate and actual possession of
the alcohol.5 °
2. Modern Definition of Constructive Possession
State v. Spillman5 1 was one of the first reported cases in which
a court articulated a definition of possession that is consistent with
many of the evidentiary requirements and definitions of possession
employed in a number of jurisdictions today.52 In Spillman, the
appellant and his associate were arrested for possession of intoxi-
cating liquor, despite their initial denial of any knowledge or con-
nection with the contraband."3 They were found walking toward
a crate of whiskey which was located approximately a half a block
away from where they were apprehended. 4 Finding possession
to exist, the court held:
'Possession may be either actual or constructive. Actual
possession exists when the property is in the individual
occupancy of a party or his agent, and is frequently
expressed as possession in fact. Constructive possession is
that possession which the law annexes to the legal title or
ownership of property, and where there is a right to the
immediate, actual possession of property. Such possession
is designated as "possession in law," but not actual
possession.'
One may have a thing in his possession without hav-
ing it actually on his person. 5
48. Parent, 212 P. at 1062. See also State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973). The
Loucks court found the defendant guilty of "possession" of marijuana despite the fact that
there was no "actual" possession. Id. at 774. The police, upon entering the defendant's
apartment, found marijuana in plain view. Id. Despite the fact that the defendant had a
roommate, that there were a number of visitors present in the immediate vicinity, and that
he was neither smoking marijuana at the time nor had any on his person, the defendant's
conviction for "possession" was affirmed. Id. at 774-76. Although it was clear that the
conviction was based on constructive possession, the Loucks court failed to articulate a
distinction between actual and constructive possession. See id.
49. Parent, 212 P. at 1062.
50. Id.
51. 188 P. 915 (Wash. 1920).
52. State v. Spillman 188 P. 915, 917 (Wash. 1920). See also Reynolds v. State, 111 So.
285, 286 (Fla. 1926) (defining possession as "having personal charge of or exercising the
right of ownership, management, or control over the [item] in question.").
53. Spillman, 188 P. at 916.
54. id.
55. Id. at 917 (emphasis supplied). "'Possession means simply the owning or having a
thing in one's power.'" Id. "The meaning 'cannot be limited to manual touch or personal
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C. DEVELOPMENT IN NARCOTICS CASES
People v. Herbert"6 was the first reported narcotics case in
which a defendant was prosecuted for willful and felonious posses-
sion, even though the proscribed item was found some eight to
fifteen feet away from him.5 7 Despite the defendant's contention
that possession must be personal and actual, rather than construc-
tive, the court held to the contrary. 8 It found that the burden
rested with the prosecution to prove that the proscribed item was
in the immediate and exclusive possession of the defendant, and
once that burden was met, constructive possession was deemed to
exist.59 The trial judge instructed the jury that in order to find the
accused guilty of criminal possession, the prosecution was also
required to show that the contraband was under his dominion and
control."° The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision,
finding sufficient evidence to constructively connect the defend-
ant with the narcotics.
In People v. Sinclair,6 2 Sinclair was arrested after having
ordered a co-defendant, who was riding as a passenger, to throw a
match-book containing morphine from the car into the street. 3
The court held that Sinclair was guilty of possession, despite the
fact that he never actually possessed the contraband, because he
was in the exclusive control of the vehicle, he negotiated for the
sale of the morphine, and he picked up the co-defendant who did
have actual, physical possession.64 Moreover, the fact that the
morphine was thrown by the passenger from the vehicle accord-
ing to Sinclair's direction buttressed the finding that dominion and
control over the contraband existed.65
The Sinclair court thus expanded the holding in Herbert and
custody.' One who deposits the prohibited articles 'in a place of concealment' may be
deemed to 'have them in his possession.'" Id.
56. 210 P. 276 (Cal. 1922).
57. People v. Herbert, 210 P. 276, 276 (Cal. 1922). Herbert, at the time of his arrest,
threw a package containing narcotics into the street. Id. The arresting officer did not
actually see anything being thrown, but felt the motion of Herbert's arm and heard a
corresponding sound. Id. Using his flashlight, the officer found several packages containing
drugs some distance away. Id.
58. Id. at 277.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. But see Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 756. Whitebread & Stevens
interpret the court's holding in the Herbert decision to be based on actual possession, rather
than constructive possession: "[Tihe negative pregnant of the court's holding is that an
instruction on constructive possession would have been error." Id.
62. 19 P.2d 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
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earlier cases by broadening the requirement of "exclusive con-
trol."'66 The court focused upon the proprietary interest a defend-
ant had in an item or an area where narcotics were discovered.
Moreover, the court substantially expanded the notion of "domin-
ion and control" to encompass not only actual and immediate
physical control, but also the defendant's capacity to exercise a
"directing influence" over the contraband.68
The early cases dealing with possession of controlled sub-
stances ostensibly held that knowledge of the character of the sub-
stance in question was a necessary prerequisite to a finding of
possession. 69 Additionally, the term "possess" as used in criminal
statutes has ordinarily been deemed to denote an intentional con-
trol of a specific item accompanied by the actual knowledge of its
nature.7 ° Outside the criminal context, however, knowledge of
the presence of an item or its character is not a requisite element
of possession.7'
III. DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH DAKOTA LAW
A. HISTORY
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act was fashioned to
achieve uniformity between the laws of the individual states and
66. Id. The requirement of "exclusive control" rested upon defendant's proprietary
interest in the vehicle, which was the area where the contraband was located just prior to
arrest. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 757.
67. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 763. The proprietary of interest test,
alluded to in Sinclair, is a test that attaches importance to the accused's proprietary of
interest in the place or thing where contraband is discovered. Id. A jurisdiction that
blindly imputes possession based exclusively upon this test, effectively punishes a property
owner for acquiescing to the presence of narcotics within the realm of his proprietary of
interest. Id. at 764. The exclusive use of the proprietary of interest test as a basis for
imposing criminal liability can lead to unwarranted results, as the test does not demonstrate
that an accused had the capacity to exercise dominion or control over the contraband.
Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 763. See also State v. Larson, 274 N.W.2d 884, 885-
86 (N.D. 1979) (Burdick, S. Ct. Comm'r, concurring specially). Constructive possession was
found where the defendant, as the owner of the motor vehicle, was aware of the presence
of the narcotics in his vehicle and transported them without objection, although another
defendant claimed exclusive possession. Id. See also People v. Torres, 43 P.2d 374, 374
(Cal. Ct. App. 1935) (finding possession to be immediate and exclusive and under the
dominion and control of the defendant when narcotics were found in an unoccupied room
of a boarding house that was owned and operated by the defendant).
68. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 757.
69. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 111 So. 285, 286 (Fla. 1926). See supra notes 25-37.
70. State v. Labato, 80 A.2d 617, 622 (N.J. 1951). See Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224,
225 (1921) (upholding as valid a federal law making it a crime to possess counterfeiting dies
when the statute was construed to necessitate conscious possession).
71. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 753 n.4. See also South Staffordshire
Water Co. v. Sharman, 2 Q.B. 44, 45 (1896) (finding a landowner to have possession of a ring
discovered by a finder at the bottom of a pool on his land, although the landowner had no
prior knowledge of its existence).
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those enacted by the federal government.7 2 Prior to legislative
adoption of the Act, possession of narcotics in North Dakota was
ostensibly a strict liability crime.73 Section 19-03-02 of the North
Dakota Century Code provided that: "it shall be unlawful for any
person to grow, manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell,
prescribe, administer, dispense, furnish, give away, trade, or com-
pound any narcotic drug ....7 4 North Dakota case law discussing
the mens rea requirement within this statutory period is scant.
In 1971, the North Dakota Legislature substantially adopted
the major provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
while also using the Federal Controlled Substances Act as a
model.7" Regarding the possession of controlled substances, the
North Dakota codification of the Uniform Act mirrored the mens
rea requirement set forth in the Federal Controlled Substances
Act and provided that: "It is unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally to possess a controlled substance .... .76 The
North Dakota statute which codified the Uniform Act remained
virtually unchanged until 1975.7 7
A 1973 study led to a subsequent overhaul of the North
Dakota Criminal Code, which had existed without material
change for a number of decades .7  The committee that studied
the matter found that crimes were scattered throughout the entire
Century Code and were defined with little consistency. 9 Varying
culpabilities and definitions of criminal intent existed, setting forth
72. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 2 (1988). See also
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). The halting of the spread of addiction to
narcotics was originally said to be an "incidental purpose" of the original federal legislation,
which served as a basis for the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 253.
73. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03-02 (1960).
74. id.
75. See generally UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 1
(1988). The Legislature repealed the Uniform Drug Act (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03-01 to
19-03-32) by 1971 N.D. Laws ch. 235, and enacted in lieu thereof the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act. This provision was originally codified at section 19-03.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code and went into effect on July 1, 1971. Id. The Uniform Controlled
Substances Act was derived from the Federal Controlled Substances Act. State v. Rippley,
319 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1982).
76. See 1971 N.D. Laws ch. 235 § 23(3) (emphasis supplied). See also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
(1988). It should be noted that the culpability language of "knowingly" and "intentionally,"
while present in the Federal Controlled Substances Act, is absent from the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act.
77. See 1973 N.D. Laws ch. 199 §§ 1, 2.
78. See SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES ON S.B. 2441 BEFORE THE NORTH
DAKOTA SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY (1989) [hereinafter MINUTES] (statements of
Senator Wayne Stenehjem and Bruce Quick of the Attorney General's Office); see also
NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MINUTES OF COMM. ON JUDICIARY "A" (May 18,
1973) (background to crimnal code).
79. MINUTES, supra note 78, at 2 (testimony of Bruce Quick).
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the need for greater clarification. 0 The culpability requirement
of all crimes that existed outside of the Criminal Code was subse-
quently removed, with the intention that an automatic cross-refer-
encing into the Criminal Code would occur.8 '
When examining the controlled substances statute of the
North Dakota Century Code, the committee examined the culpa-
bility requirement of "knowingly" and "intentionally" that was set
forth in its Controlled Substances Act.8 2 The committee con-
cluded that codifying the culpability requirement set forth therein
was unnecessary under North Dakota law."' Section 12.1-02-02 of
the North Dakota Criminal Code provided the rationale for the
decision: "If a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime
does not specify any culpability and does not provide explicitly
that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability
that is required is willfully."8 4 "Willfully," as defined in the Code,
encompassed the "intentionally" and "knowingly" culpability
requirement set forth in the Federal Controlled Substances Act
and North Dakota's adaptation thereof.8 5 The committee's inten-
tion was that this "catch-all" language would then apply to all
crimes that did not articulate a specific mens rea requirement.8 6
The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, did not interpret
the possession statute or the corresponding legislative intent in
this manner.8 7  To the contrary, the court determined that
whether a specific mens rea requirement was an element of a
criminal offense had to be determined by the specific language of
the statute in light of its "manifest purpose and design."'8 Com-
mentators suggested that the court analyzed section 12.1-02-02,





84. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2) (1985).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12 .1-02 -0 2(lXe) (1985). "A person engages in conduct ...
'Willfully' if he engages in the conduct intentionally, knowingly or recklessly." Id.
86. See supra note 78 (articulating the ostensible intent of the North Dakota
Legislature). This intention by the committee seems to be supported by a plain reading of
section 12.1-02-02(2) of the North Dakota Criminal Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-
02(2) (1985) (providing that "[i]f a statute.., does not specify any culpability and does not
provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is
required is willfully.").
87. See State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1982). The court analyzed the
legislative history of section 19-03.1-23 and determined that the legislature intended the
statute to contain no culpability requirement. Id. "The Legislature has clearly indicated its
intent to make possession of a controlled substance a strict-liability offense." State v. Morris,
331 N.W.2d 48, 57 (N.D. 1983) (emphasis supplied).
88. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d at 133.
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noting the absence of a mens rea requirement in section 19-03.1-
23(3).89 In doing so, the court rejected the committee's original
design and expressly refused to apply the culpability requirement
set forth in section 12.1-02-02 of the Code to other parts of the
Code.9 ° Consequently, the court deemed North Dakota's posses-
sion statute a strict liability offense.91 By judicially construing the
89. See supra note 78 (emphasis in original). Section 12.1-02-02 provided (and still
provides):
1. For the purposes of this title, a person engages in conduct:
a. "Intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his purpose to do
SO.
b. "Knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he knows or has a firm
belief, unaccompanied by substantial doubt, that he is doing so, whether
or not it is his purpose to do so.
c. "Recklessly" if he engages in the conduct in conscious and clearly
unjustifiable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the
relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from
acceptable standards of conduct, except that, as provided in section 12.1-
04-02, awareness of the risk is not required where its absence is due to
self-induced intoxication.
d. "Negligently" if he engages in the conduct in unreasonable disregard of
a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such
disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of
conduct.
e. "Willfully" if he engages in the conduct intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.
2. If a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime does not specify any
culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty
without culpability, the culpability that is required is willfully.
3. a. Except as otherwise expressly provided, where culpability is required,
that kind of culpability is required with respect to every element of the
conduct and to those attendant circumstances specified in the definition
of the offense, except that where the required culpability is
"intentionally", the culpability required as to an attendant circumstance
is "knowingly".
b. Except as otherwise expressly provided, if conduct is an offense if it
causes a particular result, the required degree of culpability is required
with respect to the result.
c. Except as otherwise expressly provided, culpability is not required with
respect to any fact which is solely a basis for grading.
d. Except as otherwise expressly provided, culpability is not required with
respect to facts which establish that a defense does not exist, if the
defense is defined in chapters 12.1-01 through 12.1-06; otherwise the
least kind of culpability required for the offense is required with respect
to such facts.
e. A factor as to which it is expressly stated that it must "in fact" exist is a
factor for which culpability is not required.
4. Any lesser degree of required culpability is satisfied if the proven degree of
culpability is higher.
5. Culpability is not required as to the fact that conduct is an offense, except as
otherwise expressly provided in a provision outside this title.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (1985).
90. See supra note 78.
91. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d at 133. The court required no proof of guilty knowledge. Id.
It stated:
Whether or not § 19-03.1-23(1) is a strict liability offense is a question of
legislative intent to be determined by the language of the . .. [statute] in
connection with its manifest purpose and design.
Our review of the legislative history of § 19-03.1-23 indicates that the
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omission of any mention of criminal intent from the legislative
enactment as a dispensing of it, the state was no longer required to
prove that a defendant who was in the proximity of a controlled
substance knew of its presence or its character.
92
In State v. Rippley,93 Rippley argued that the court's interpre-
tation of the North Dakota possession statute as a strict liability
statute violated the United States Constitution as well as the North
Dakota Constitution because "it provide[d] for severe penalties
which may be levied against the innocent or mistaken, as well as
against conscious wrongdoers, and therefore... fail[ed] to give fair
warning of criminality and permit[ted] excessive discretion in law
enforcement. '94 Although not directly addressing the constitu-
tional issue, the court stated that North Dakota's possession statute
"by its express language, require[d] neither knowledge nor
intent."9 5 The court added that the state has the power to prohibit
the doing of an act, such as possession of narcotics, which involved
neither moral turpitude nor evil motive,96 especially as to public
welfare offenses, by not requiring a specific mens rea to sustain a
finding of guilt.97 In an effort to protect its citizenry, the regula-
tion of such public welfare offenses has been found to fall directly
legislature intended the statute to contain no culpability requirement. Not only
does subsection 1 contain no language requiring culpability but, also, in 1975 the
legislature removed from § 19-03.1-23(3) the terms 'knowingly or intentionally.'
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act is based on the Federal Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The federal counterpart to § 19-03.1-23,
NDCC, is 21 USC § 841, which contains a culpability requirement of 'knowingly
or intentionally.' This culpability language is absent in the Uniform Act and in
its North Dakota adaptation.
We conclude, therefore, that § 19-03.1-23(1) [and 19-03.1-23(3)] defines a
strict liability offense ....
Id. (citations omitted).
See State v. Coutts, 364 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1985). The North Dakota Supreme Court has,
on occasion, readily interpreted the legislative intent to apply crimes set forth in title 12.1,
the North Dakota Criminal Code, to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act set forth in
chapter 19 of the Century Code. Id. It should be noted, however, that Coutts involved a
conspiracy charge and that specific language in the chapter provided for it to apply outside
the chapter. Id. at 91.
92. See State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1982).
93. 319 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1982).
94. State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129, 134 (N.D. 1982).
95. Id. at 133. The court did not directly address the statute's constitutionality because
it held that Rippley could only challenge the statute as it applied to him. Id. at 134.
Rippley did not contend that he mistakenly possessed the contraband. Id. He therefore
lacked standing to make such a constitutional objection. Id.
96. Id. at 131, 132 (citing State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301, 306 (N.D. 1981)). Courts
in various jurisdictions have traditionally employed alternative terminology to connotate
the requisite inens rea requirement which personifies an "evil purpose or mental
culpability." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
97. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d at 133. The court stated:
We find it difficult to conceive of any offense which so adversely affects public
welfare and interest as the wrongful sale of narcotic drugs. This unquestionably
justifies a State, in the exercise of its police power, to prohibit [the possession]
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within the state's police power.9° The existence of a general risk
to the community due to the presence of narcotics therein pro-
vides the underlying basis for the imposition of strict liability for
thereof,. . . and to place on all persons the responsibility to see that they do not
[possess] drugs unlawfully.
Id. at 133 (quoting State v. Page, 395 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. 1965)). See State v. Napolis, 436
S.W.2d 645, 647 (Mo. 1969) (approving the same language). The state, in pursuance of pub-
lic policy, may enact strict liability crimes. See Shelvin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218
U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910). "[S]uch legislation may, in particular instances, be harsh, but we can
only say again what we have so often said, that this court cannot set aside legislation because
it is harsh." Id. at 70. See also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). Many instances
of strict liability statutes "are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise of what is
called police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon [the] achievement
of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in
se." Id. at 252; Coates v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 346, 347 (Ky. 1971) (holding that a
statute which prohibits the possession of a drug did not violate any constitutional guarantee
simply because it did not require criminal intent or knowledge). But see Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) ("The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence."); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S 246 (1952). The court in Morissette stated:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A
relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to,' and
has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deter-
rence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation
for public prosecution. Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English com-
mon law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's sweeping
statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a 'vicious will.'
Id. at 250-51. Intent is generally an indispensable part of a criminal offense. State v.
Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 50 (La. 1980). The criminalization of the unknowing possession of
narcotics not only offends the conscious, but cannot be made legal. Id.
It is generally more desirable to impose criminal liability upon those who are "morally
blameworthy" for the offense of narcotics possession. King, supra note 5, at 711. "Argu-
ments of authority, policy, and reason compel the conclusion that it is desirable to punish
only those who knowingly and intentionally possess dangerous drugs and not to force indi-
viduals to act at their own peril." Id. (emphasis in original). The necessity for the existence
of an appropriate mens rea requirement in a criminal statute such as narcotics possession
furthers the overriding cornerstone of modern punishment-deterrence. Id. at 713. Com-
mentators have stated:
'Our system does not interfere till harm has been done and has been proved to
have been done with the appropriate mens rea. But the risk that is here taken is
not taken for nothing. It is the price we pay for general recognition that a man's
fate should depend upon his choice and this is to foster the prime social virtue of
self-restraint.'
Id. at 714 (citations omitted). It is the common-law view that it is guilty knowledge or
intent which makes a particular act criminal. Id. at 713. Without such knowledge or intent,
the punishment of an individual for a particular act is "just plain unfair." Id.
98. McCrary v. State, 429 So. 2d 1121, 1125 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 913 (1983). The Supreme Court of the United States has generally given much
deference to the historical power of a state to enact strict liability offenses. State v. Buttrey,
651 P.2d 1075, 1081 (Or. 1982).
The doctrines of actus reus, [and] mens rea, . . . have historically provided
the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving
aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and
medical view of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been
thought to be the province of the States.
Id. (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
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narcotics possession. 99 Consequently, whether or not scienter is an
element of an offense is a matter of legislative intent, and it is
within the province of the judiciary to ascertain the manifest pur-
pose of the statute. 100
In State v. Morris,1 1 the defendant was found guilty of narcot-
ics possession when contraband was discovered in plain view in a
van in which he and another individual were passengers.' 02 The
court readily acknowledged that possession could be actual or con-
structive.'0 3 Consequently, the state did not have to establish
actual possession, as possession could be established by an affirma-
tive showing that the defendant constructively possessed the sub-
stance.10 4 The court further held that a showing of constructive
possession did not require that the defendant have knowledge of
the drug's presence or knowledge that the material he possessed
was a controlled substance.' 0 5  The court stated that constructive
possession could be inferred from a "totality of the circumstances"
and was deemed sufficient to sustain the conviction.' 0 6 Evidence
99. David S. Caudill, Comment, Probability Theory and Constructive Possession of
Narcotics: On Finding that Winning Combination, 17 Hous. L. REV. 541, 545 n.40 (1980)
(the risk of narcotics addiction is present even if the possessor has no criminal purpose). See
State v. Buttrey, 651 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Or. 1982) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AUSTIN W.
Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 218 (1972)) (stating that "[sitrict liability statutes
have been passed because of the difficulty in proving intent, knowledge, recklessness or
negligence, and because of a legislative perception that evil should be eradicated, even at
the risk of convicting blameless defendants.").
100. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922).
101. 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1983).
102. State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 54 (N.D. 1983). Upon a tip from an informant,
police officers stopped a vehicle that fit the informant's description. Id. at 51. Looking
inside, one of the officers saw a marijuana cigarette and a plastic bag containing additional
marijuana. Id. A further search of the vehicle revealed a large quantity of marijuana. Id.
The contraband was located behind a console and between two seats. Id.
103. Id. at 53.
104. Id. Distinguishing actual possession from constructive possession, the Morris
court stated that a party is deemed to have actual possession of a controlled substance if it
was found on his person. Id. Constructive possession is shown by evidence establishing an
accused's power and capability to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. Id.
105. Id. at 54. It should be noted that the trial court in Morris essentially required the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Morris knowingly possessed the contraband
by including the knowledge requirement in its instruction to the jury. See id. at 57. A later
decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court has indicated that the instruction given in
Morris placed a greater burden of proof on the state than what the statutes required. See
State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175, 177 (N.D. 1989).
106. Morris, 331 N.W.2d at 54. Factors giving rise to an inference of possession in
Morris were his "presence in the place where a controlled substance is found, his proximity
to the place where it is found, and the fact that the controlled substance is found in plain
view." Id. (citations omitted). The factors enumerated in Morris are not an all-inclusive list.
State v. Dymowski, 458 N.W.2d 490, 500 (N.D. 1990). See also United States v. Knox, 888
F.2d 585, 587 (8th Cir. 1989) (supporting the "totality of the circumstances" test); People v.
Pittman, 575 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding the totality of the circumstances
to indicate that the accused constructively possessed the narcotics); Commonwealth v.
Aviles, No. 1650, 1991 WL 285792, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (reargument granted (Mar.
12, 1992)) (holding that "constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of facts
that possession of the contraband was more likely than not.").
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of constructive possession is that which establishes an accused's
power and capability to exercise dominion and control over the
contraband.10 7 Dominion and control is established where the evi-
dence supports the conclusion that the defendant has the right or
ability "to control, in a realistic and practical sense, the area
where, or the container in which, the contraband is found.' 10 8
Despite the fact that the conviction was based entirely upon cir-
cumstantial evidence, the court held that the defendant's proxim-
ity' 0 9 to the place the substance was found, his mere presence, and
the fact that the controlled substance was in plain view, were evi-
dentiary factors which supported the inference of possession.1 0
State v. Michlitsch"' marked the beginning of a retreat from
a rigid adherence to the Rippley and Morris strict liability stan-
dard for possession of controlled substances. The court in Mich-
litsch held that the defendant could claim lack of knowledge as an
affirmative defense to a charge of possession of a controlled sub-
stance. 12 In Michlitsch, the defendant was a tenant of a trailer
but was not present when law enforcement officials arrived and
arrested Ronald Zuraff, who was in a bedroom where two cake
pans containing several bags of marijuana were found. 1 3 Zuraff,
who did not reside in the trailer, often spent the night and stored
some clothing and other personal effects there. 1 4 Zuraff pled
guilty to the charges against him and testified that the contraband
was owned solely by him and that the defendant had no knowl-
107. State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 53 (N.D. 1983).
108. Id. at 54.
109. See State v. Mathews, 484 P.2d 942, 943 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). Although not
necessarily dispositive, a number of courts focusing more narrowly on the control element
of constructive possession have held that the accused's proximity to the contraband
(proximity test) constitutes a factor for determining the existence of possession. Id. See also
Duran v. People, 360 P.2d 132, 133 (Colo. 1961) (where the contraband was in easy reach of
defendant, it was enough to find that it was under his dominion and control, even though it
was concealed and he did not own the vehicle or the purse in which the contraband was
discovered); State v. Dodd, 137 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Wis. 1965). It is not compulsory to have
actual physical possession in order to sustain a conviction for possession. Id. It suffices if the
defendant has constructive possession or is "within such juxtaposition" to the contraband as
to justify a finding of possession. Id. But see Moffatt v. State, 583 So. 2d 779, 781 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that mere proximity by itself is not enough to sustain a conviction);
Cunningham v. State, 583 So. 2d 960, 962 (Miss. 1991) (holding that proximity alone is an
inadequate basis to infer that the accused was in a position to exercise dominion and control
over the particular substance).
110. State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 55 (N.D. 1983). See also State v. Connery, 441
N.W.2d 651, 655 (N.D. 1989) (holding that possession, actual or constructive, can be shown
entirely by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom).
111. 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1989).
112. State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175, 178 (N.D. 1989).
113. Id. at 176.
114. Id.
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edge of its presence. 1 5 The trial court refused to instruct the jury
that it was an affirmative defense to the crime of possession and
that the accused had no knowledge of the identity of the contra-
band or its presence, despite the defendant's request." 6
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court adhered to the
conclusion set forth in Rippley and Morris that the North Dakota
Legislature intended the possession statute to constitute a strict
liability offense.' '7 However, it acknowledged that it would be dif-
ficult to sustain such an interpretation of the statutory provision,
without the inclusion of such an instruction, against a constitu-
tional attack by an accused who possessed a controlled substance
unwittingly."18 The court recognized that the affirmative defense
was a logical accommodation that acknowledged the rationale for
the legislative designation of such crimes as strict liability offenses
while recognizing the constitutional interests of an accused." 9
Consequently, reversible error was found and the case was
115. Id.
116. Id. The instruction Michlitsch requested stated in part:
It is an affirmative defense to the crime of possession.., that the defendant(1) had no knowledge of the presence of the drug or (2) had no knowledge of the
identity of the substance. If the accused can affirmatively establish she possessed
the controlled substance unknowingly, then she will not be held to have
unlawfully possessed the substance in violation of the law.
Id. As Michlitsch's primary defense was unwitting possession, the trial court's refusal to
give an appropriate instruction was reversible error. Id. at 179. Despite the state's conten-
tion, the court held that such an instruction did not '"completely ignore"' the previous
holdings enumerated in Morris and Rippley, which required no proof of knowledge with
respect to neither the existence nor the nature of the prohibited substance. Id. at 176-77.
117. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 178.
118. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court found persuasive the language set forth
in State v. Cleppe, 635 P.2d 435 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982)
(Washington's possession statute is substantially identical with the former version of North
Dakota's possession statute):
That unwitting possession has been allowed as an affirmative defense in
simple possession cases may seem anolamous. If guilty knowledge or intent to
possess are not elements of a crime, of what avail is it for the defendant to prove
his possession was unwitting? Such a provision ameliorates the harshness of the
almost strict criminal liability our law imposes for unauthorized possession of a
controlled substance. If the defendant can affirmatively establish his 'possession'
was unwitting, then he had no possession for which the law will convict. The
burden of proof, however, is on the defendant ....
Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 177-78 (quoting Cleppe, 635 P.2d at 439-440) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See State v. Buttrey, 651 P.2d 1075, 1083 (Or. 1982) (noting that there is no constitu-
tional bar to the creation of a criminal offense without culpable conduct, provided that an
opportunity exists for an excuse or mitigating factor in the way of an affirmative defense).
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the Washington affirmative defense
scheme, there is a fundamental difference between the holdings in Morris, Rippley, and
Michlitsch and those expressed by the courts in Washington. State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d
48, 54 n.3 (N.D. 1983). Although both jurisdictions agreed that simple possession required
no proof of knowledge, the Supreme Court of Washington requires an affirmative showing
of knowledge by the state when the charge is either "delivery of a controlled substance" or
"possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver." Id.
119. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 178.
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remanded to the trial court with the jury to be instructed on the
affirmative defense.'
20
It was evident in Michlitsch that the North Dakota Supreme
Court was concerned about the constitutionality of its previous
interpretation of the state's possession statute, as set forth in Rip-
pley and Morris.12 ' The court in Michlitsch side-stepped striking
down the problematic statute by asserting that unwitting posses-
sion was an affirmative defense to a possession of a controlled sub-
stance charge.' 22  The availability of the "lack of knowledge"
affirmative defense, which permitted the defendant to prove that
his or her possession was unwitting, in essence relieved the state of
an obligation to prove some degree of intent. 123 In providing for
the affirmative defense, the North Dakota Supreme Court implied
that the statute in its present version did not sufficiently safeguard
the rights of an accused.' 24 As such, the affirmative defense essen-
tially became a bootstrap by which the state's burden of proving
what should have been an essential element of the offense was
alleviated. ' 25
B. NEW LEGISLATION
The North Dakota Legislature, in an effort to more accurately
convey its intention and remedy the judicial interpretation of the
statute, amended and reenacted it.126 The reenactment, which is
120. Id. at 180.
121. See id. at 178.
122. Id. at 177-78. The state is not required to prove the nonexistence of the defense.
Id. at 178. See State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 731 (N.D. 1990) (affirming the holding
in Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175).
123. See generally Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 175.
124. Id.; see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Although placing on the
accused the burden of proving an exculpatory fact is not necessarily unconstitutional, the
state may not shift onto the defendant the burden of proving the nonexistence of an
essential ingredient of the offense charged. Id. at 203 n.9.
The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the burden of
proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a
defendant. The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved
enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been
proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of
convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden
will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to
hardship or oppression.
Id. " 'For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that the evidence held to be
inculpatory has at least a sinister significance, or if this at times be lacking, there must be in
any event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge
... Id. at 203-04 n.9 (citations omitted).
125. See generally Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175. Although adhering to the conclusion
that the North Dakota Legislature did not intend knowledge to be an element of the
offense, the court acknowledged the questionable constitutionality of the statutory
provision. Id. at 178.
126. See 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 267 § 1.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the current reading of the statute, requires that possession of a
controlled substance be shown to have been willful in order to
sustain a conviction. 127 The effective date of the amendment was
July 1, 1989.128 Consequently, North Dakota's criminal possession
of a controlled substance statute has been statutorily abrogated to
the extent that it is no longer a strict liability offense. 129 The cur-
rent statute explicitly mandates a mens rea requirement by requir-
ing the state to prove culpability, rather than forcing a defendant
to prove a lack thereof by way of an affirmative defense. 130  To
date, the North Dakota Supreme Court has not had an opportunity
to fully communicate the evidentiary requirements that it finds
persuasive in light of the recent amendment.1 3 ' How a North
Dakota court will formulate its decision will largely depend upon
the weight that it will give certain evidentiary requirements. Con-
sequently, it becomes necessary to look to other jurisdictions
which have similar statutory schemes and have addressed the
matter.
IV. EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS
There are a great number of evidentiary factors and circum-
stances from which a jury may infer possession.132 Although some
factors weigh more heavily than others, no single variable is gener-
ally determinative. 133 Each case arises as a unique combination of
variables that juries are asked to evaluate when considering
guilt.' 34
127. Id.
128. State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 730 n.3 (N.D. 1990). The Legislature did not
give retroactive effect to the statute; hence, those defendants charged prior to the July 1,
1989 amendment received the application of the former statute. Id. at 731 n.3.
129. Id. at 731.
130. Id. at 730-31 n.3.
131. See generally Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726 (the last reported case directly
addressing the issue of constructive possession of narcotics in North Dakota to date).
132. Caudill, supra note 99, at 542. Evidentiary factors include, but are not limited to:
odor, refusal to give one's name to law enforcement, informant or co-defendant testimony,
prior convictions, the defendant's arrival during the search, the contraband in plain view,
the defendant's proximity to the substance, the proprietary interest in the substance or in
the object where the contraband is found, the proprietary interest in belongings found near
the contraband, the defendant's prior visits to the premises where the contraband is known
to exist, the defendant's mail delivered to the premises, defendant admissions and res
gestae statements, conflicting statements, fingerprints on the drug container, attempts to
flee, the presence of the accused, the presence of other people, debris or evidence of use,
needle marks if recent, convenience in accessibility, and suspicious moves or conduct. Id.
at 557 n.116.
133. See id. at 556-67. See also State v. Kroening, No. 66,023, 1991 WL 270748, at *6
(Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1991) (holding that mere knowledge of an item's presence or mere
physical control will not be enough to sustain a conviction).
134. Caudill, supra note 99, at 542. Evidentiary factors tending to establish an
affirmative link between the accused and the prohibited item must be considered in
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A. DOMINION AND CONTROL
It is not necessary to prove ownership of the contraband, in
the sense of title, to establish constructive possession.1 3 5 However,
it is generally held that an individual has constructive possession
over a controlled substance if it can be established that an accused
has ownership, dominion and control over the contraband itself,136
or dominion and control over the premises in which the contra-
band was discovered. 3 ' Control has been readily found where
the defendant has, by way of legal authority or in a practical sense,
maintained a possessory interest in the item where the contraband
was discovered. ' 38
combination, as no one factor alone is decisive. Id. at 549 n.64. The infinite variation in
factual situations prevents empirical studies of constructive possession and reliance on
precedent from being of much utility. Id. at 548 n.62.
135. State v. Brown, 404 A.2d 1111, 1116 (N.J. 1979). The court found that an
existence of ownership in conjunction with possession was not an essential component of a
possessory crime, as one can knowingly control contraband without actually owning it. Id.
See United States v. Dreyfus de Campos, 698 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
947 (1983) (stating that one who exercises dominion and control over a thing in which
narcotics are concealed, may be deemed in possession of them); United States v. Horton,
488 F.2d 374, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974) (holding that mere
ownership did not constitute constructive possession where, although the accused owned
the vehicle where the contraband was found, the attache case containing the narcotics did
not belong to him nor did he did have the keys to his car on his person); United States v.
Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484, 488-89 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 915 (1974) (finding
that control over the premises where the narcotics are found is strong evidence in support
of a finding of possession); Peachie v. State, 100 A.2d 1, 2 (Md. 1953) (inferring that actual
ownership is not a mandatory requirement of constructive possession, although an
evidentiary factor); Cunningham v. State, 583 So. 2d 960, 962 (Miss. 1991) (finding there to
be a "presumption of constructive possession [which] arises against the owner of premises
upon which [narcotics are] found.").
136. See United States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that
constructive possession is determined by whether an accused had dominion and control
over a substance).
137. United States v. Townley, 942 F.2d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir. 1991). The accused's
fingerprints on a package of cocaine was the only link connecting him to it. Id. The court
held that, alone, such evidence was insufficient to support a finding of possession because in
the absence of additional evidence, the circumstances were not indicative of a right to
control the contraband. Id. at 1326-27. See also United States v. Tisdale, No. 90-3302, 1992
WL 56, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992) (defining constructive possession as the 'ownership, dominion
or control' over an article or the premises where it is discovered); United States v. Temple
890 F.2d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1989) (defining constructive possession as knowledge of
presence plus control; both elements were established where the accused was seen
removing an object, which later was determined to be crack cocaine, from his clothing and
throwing it); United States v. Knox, 888 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
constructive possession includes dominion and control over the premises where the
controlled substance was discovered); State v. Woodruff, 288 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Neb. 1980)
(holding that despite defendant's denial of knowledge, "constructive possession may be
[shown] . . . by the accused's proximity to the substance at the time of the arrest or by a
showing of ownership, dominion, and right of control .... ").
138. See Borchardt v. United States, No. 82-1719, 725 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 937 (1984) (renumbered No. 83-1643) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting). In
an unreported opinion, the trial court in Borchardt convicted the defendant of possession
where a plane containing large amounts of narcotics crashed. Id. at 938-39. The defendant
was not on board at the time, but dominion and control was found to exist from evidence
which showed that he loaded the plane. Id. at 942-43 n.5. The Fifth Circuit agreed,
holding that the defendant's participation in the venture, inter alia, permitted the
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It is not uncommon for constructive possession to be judicially
interpreted even more broadly to include a right, a capacity, or an
ability to reduce the substance to one's control. 39 Consequently,
an accused need not be presently exercising his or her right to con-
trol the contraband at the time of arrest; it is enough that he or she
could have done so.' 40 In this light, nonfeasance can be the actus
reus which gives rise to the imposition of criminal liability. 14  In
other words, the forbidden act giving rise to a finding of possession
is the failure of an accused to affirmatively act to terminate his or
her ability to control the contraband. 142 Considering that the fail-
ure to affirmatively act to eliminate the circumstances which give
rise to a finding of dominion and control, "it is obvious that to have
constructive possession one must have some knowledge that the
material is present.' 43 Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon a
judicial body to require a demonstrated showing of a "conscious
right" to dominion and control as a prerequisite to a finding of
guilt. 144
Some jurisdictions require that in order to find that the
accused "possessed," or had dominion and control over, the con-
traband in question, the control must be more than momentary. 145
inference of constructive possession. Id. See also United States v. Jones, 676 F.2d 327, 332
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982) (having on his person the keys to the trunk
where narcotics were later discovered constituted control of the substance located therein);
United States v. Williams, 503 F.2d 50, 53 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that claim check
corresponding to luggage containing narcotics was deemed sufficient evidence of dominion
and control over the contraband, even where the luggage was lost in transit).
139. United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1979) (possessing the key to
the trunk of a vehicle and keys to containers holding narcotics found inside the trunk
demonstrated that the accused knowingly had the power to exercise control over the
contraband; therefore, the substance could readily be reduced to actual possession). See
United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that constructive
possession exists where an accused is in a position to exercise dominion or control over the
contraband); Stewart v. State, No. CA CR 91-118, 1991 WL 271059, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App.
1991) (implying constructive possession when the substance was found in a place where the
accused had an immediate and exclusive access, thereby giving him a right to control it).
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990) (defining constructive possession as
the power and intent to control an item or as one who is in a position to exercise dominion
and control over an item).
140. See King, supra note 5, at 692 n.l. Some commentators suggest that it is not
required that an accused be able to control the contraband at the time of arrest in order to
sustain a finding of possession; it being enough that he or she could have done so in the past.
Id.
141. King, supra note 5, at 692.
142. Id.
143. Greely v. State, 301 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973).
144. Commonwealth v. Aviles, No. 1650, 1991 WL 285792, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(defining constructive possession as "conscious dominion" and demonstrated by a showing
that the accused had the power of control over an item coupled with an intent to exercise
the same). See People v. Gory, 170 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1946) (finding knowledge of the
item's presence to be the essence of the offense of possession and requiring such knowledge
to precede control).
145. See Reynolds v. State, 111 So. 285, 286 (Fla. 1926) (requiring a material and
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This is probably a better approach because to hold to the contrary
"could result in manifest injustice to admittedly innocent individu-
als." ' 4 6 The critical inquiry is whether a finder of fact, looking at
the totality of the circumstances of a particular case, could con-
clude that a defendant had some appreciable ability in a readily
discernible fashion to guide the destiny of the substance in
question. 147
B. KNOWLEDGE
A number of jurisdictions not only require the state to prove
knowledge of the contraband's presence beyond a reasonable
doubt, but also require proof that the defendant actually knew of
its illicit character. 148 Such a position treats the two aspects of
conscious possession, as distinguished from a mere superficial or involuntary possession);
State v. Gorder, 811 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Mont. 1991) (defining possession as the knowing
control of an item for a sufficient period of time); State v. Coca, 341 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Neb.
1983) (holding that "[t]o possess a narcotic drug means to have actual control, care, and
management of, and not a passing control, fleeting and shadowy in its nature."); State v.
Williams, 319 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Neb. 1982) (finding possession to mean "something more
than momentary control"). But see People v. Sierra, 379 N.E.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1978)
(holding that crimes of possession "include but make no allowance or exception for fleeting
or momentary contact," thus the alleged "brief handling" of the substance in question was
not a defense); Gillis v. Commonwealth, 208 S.E.2d 768, 771 (Va. 1974) (asserting that the
duration of possession is immaterial as long as dominion and control is shown).
146. People v. Mijares, 491 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Cal. 1971) (en banc). The defendant in
Mijares went to the assistance of a friend who had passed out and could not breathe. Id. at
1116. Before summoning aid, the defendant removed a package of narcotics from the
friend's pocket and threw it into a field. Id. At trial, the jury found that the momentary
grasp of the package by the defendant constituted possession of it by him. Id. at 1117. The
court disagreed and held that when the circumstances are such that possession is merely a
transitory handling, criminal prosecution for such a superficial possession was not warranted
and indeed would be unfair. Id. at 1119-20.
147. United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court found it
unnecessary to establish that the contraband was discovered on the accused's person or
within his immediate reach in order to sustain a finding of possession. Id. It was enough to
show that he was in a position to exercise some measure of control over the contraband, be
it directly or indirectly. Id. See Greer v. United States, 600 A.2d 1086, 1087 (D.C. 1991)
(finding the defendant not to be in a position to exercise dominion and control over the
contraband because she was not in a position to guide its destiny). See also United States v.
Crippen, 459 F.2d 1387, 1388 (3d Cir. 1972) (deeming the defendant to be in constructive
possession of the contraband despite the fact that another person actually handled the
drugs and was arrested in another location, where it was shown that the defendant directed
his activities).
148. See, e.g., Moffatt v. State, 583 So. 2d 779, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that not only must the accused have knowledge of the contraband's presence, but
knowledge of its illicit nature is also required); Martin v. State, 372 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that "the evidence must establish knowledge of both the item's
presence and of its forbidden character"); State v. Nicolosi, 81 So. 2d 771, 773 (La. 1955)
(finding that there can be no possession in the legal sense without the ingredient of
knowledge); State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975) (holding that the state must
prove that the accused consciously possessed the substance as well as proving that he had
actual knowledge of its nature); Cunningham v. State, 583 So. 2d 960, 962 (Miss. 1991)
(stating that the burden is upon the prosecution to establish that the accused had
knowledge of the substance's criminal nature); State v. Gorder, 811 P.2d 1291, 1292-93
(Mont. 1991) (opining that both knowledge of the item's presence and it's forbidden
character must be shown); State v. Giddings, 352 P.2d 1003, 1009 (N.M. 1960) (concluding
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knowledge as inseparable components of the same require-
ment. 149 In those jurisdictions, the state must establish that the
accused consciously possessed and had actual knowledge of the
nature of the contraband. °50  The requisite knowledge-with
respect to both an item's presence and its illicit nature-which is
sufficient to sustain a conviction can be inferred entirely from cir-
cumstantial evidence, such as the declarations, acts, or conduct of
the accused' 5 ' and has readily been inferred from proof of posses-
sion."2 Such an inference creates a presumption that an accused
is fully cognizant of the presence and nature of the contraband.1
5 3
Although a definitive showing of both elements is essential in
most jurisdictions in order to sustain a finding of constructive pos-
session, there exists a conflict of authority among the remaining
states as to whether an accused must have knowledge of both the
presence of the substance and its criminal nature.15 4 The small
number of jurisdictions requiring no such showing of knowledge in
narcotics cases' 5  have either promulgated statutes that are in
that actual knowledge of presence and character must be proven in order to sustain a
conviction); People v. Cullen, 405 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (N.Y. 1980) (requiring that knowledge
of the contraband and possession occur at the same time). But see United States v. Berick,
710 F.2d 1035, 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983) (holding that an accused
need not know the exact nature of the contraband in order to be convicted of possession).
149. King, supra note 5, at 695.
150. Commissioner of Revenue v. Fort, 479 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Minn. 1992). Fort was a
case in which constructive possession of narcotics was considered for the purposes of
assessing tax liability. Id. at 43. However, a comparison and contrast of criminal liability
was also made. Id. at 46-47.
151. See United States v. Wainwright, 921 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that
constructive possession need not be proved by direct evidence, but rather can be
sufficiently premised upon wholly circumstantial evidence); State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d
651, 655 (N.D. 1989) (utilizing similar language); State v. Larson, 274 N.W.2d 884,885 (N.D.
1979) (holding that evidence that supports a finding of possession can be entirely
circumstantial); Commonwealth v. Caterino, No. 91-P-605, 1991 WL 272383, at *2 (Mass.
Ct. App. 1991) (stating that constructive possession can be established by circumstantial
evidence and by inferences that may be drawn from such evidence). See also Martin v.
State, 372 N.E.2d 1194, 1198-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that conduct of the accused,
such as running down a hallway to the bathroom and running the water in the sink, was
admissible to show knowledge); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1982)
(narcotics were found in a truck driven and owned by the accused who fled upon approach
by the authorities).
152. See Feltes v. People, 498 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Colo. 1972) (where the court readily
determined that knowledge of the drug's character could be inferred from proof of
possession).
153. King, supra note 5, at 696. It should be noted that great care should be taken to
refrain from equating mere proximity to a substance found somewhere other than on the
defendant's person with knowledge. Id. at 696-97. Consequently, there must be a distinct
proof of knowledge which is independent from a proof of proximity in such circumstances.
Id. at 706.
154. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 753 n.4. Those jurisdictions which are in
agreement that knowledge is a requisite element of the offense may differ on the issue of
the extent of knowledge that is required. Id.
155. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 514 P.2d 192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). The court in
Edwards held that "[t]here is no element of guilty knowledge or intent in the charge of
possession of narcotics." Id. at 193.
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essence strict liability, similar to that which North Dakota main-
tained prior to the 1989 abrogation, or do not require an accused
to have knowledge with respect to both the presence and charac-
ter of the contraband. 156 The latter view is an untenable position
under North Dakota's possession statute, as logic and reason dic-
tate that an accused could not "willfully" possess a drug unless he
or she knows the substance is a narcotic.15 7
V. JOINT POSSESSION
Although the crime of possession is, by its nature, unique to
the individual, it is universally held that possession also may be
joint.1 58 Therefore, the state is not required to prove that the con-
traband was in the exclusive possession of an accused.15 9 Where
such possession becomes most problematic is when the contraband
is found in an area of joint control or equal access.' 6 ° Reconciling
the "ability to control" test with situations in which innocents
whose "'crime' is merely being in the wrong place at the wrong
time" calls for the most exacting scrutiny.1 6 ' In these situations,
156. See, e.g., State v. Adame, 785 P.2d 1144 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). Despite
defendant's contention that knowledge was a necessary element of dominion and control,
the court held that the state may prove possession of a controlled substance without regard
to whether the accused actually knew of the presence or the identity of the substance. Id.
at 1146-47. In Washington, as was the case under North Dakota's previous strict liability
statute, the defendant who raises the affirmative defense has the burden of proving
unwitting possession. Id. The prosecution was only required to prove the fact of possession
and that the substance possessed was forbidden by statute. Id. at 1146.
157. King, supra note 5, at 695 n.25. See supra note 85 for the definition of "willfully"
as set forth in section 12.1-02-02 of the North Dakota Century Code. An approach in which
"willful" possession is inferred from circumstances where the requisite knowledge is only
that of the physical object itself without regard to its particular nature, can conceivably lead
to absurd results. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 117 N.E.2d 830, 831-32 (Mass. 1954)
(affirming a conviction of possession of narcotics where the defendant received an
unopened package in the mail which was later, upon opening at the direction of police
officers, found to contain narcotics). But see infra note 171 (noting an arguably diminished
requirement of knowledge stemming from the statutory definition of "willfully").
158. Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641, 642 (9th Cir. 1964). "It is fundamental to
our system of criminal law that guilt is individual." Id.
159. See People v. Hamilton, 35 Cal. Rptr. 812, 813 (1963). The fact that one individual
was found to be guilty of possession does not preclude a finding that another defendant was
also in possession of the same narcotic. Id. Stated differently, possession does not have to be
exclusive in any single individual. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 3.2, at 201 (2d ed. 1986). See also State v. Brown, 404 A.2d 1111, 1116 (N.J. 1979) (finding
that equal criminal responsibility exists when joint possession of an item can be
demonstrated); State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 53 (N.D. 1983) (two defendants were found
guilty of possessing the same contraband); State v. Larson, 274 N.W.2d 884,885 (N.D. 1979)
(despite the fact that another testified that he, rather than the defendant, was in the
exclusive possession of the contraband, defendant's conviction was sustained).
160. See Moffatt v. State, 583 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The Moffatt
court held that in the area of joint control, an ability to control the contraband will not be
inferred; it must be established by independent proof other than an accused's mere
proximity to it. Id.
161. King, supra note 5, at 697. One commentator cautioned that "[w]hen the accused
is only one of many with access to the place where the drugs are found, the technique of
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mere proof that an accused was present where the contraband was
found or mere association with a person who has dominion and
control over the contraband, or the property where it is discov-
ered, is generally an insufficient basis to sustain a conviction for
possession. 162
Additionally, where others have an equal access to an area
where contraband is discovered, evidence of the accused's mere
opportunity to control the contraband will not be enough to sup-
port a finding of guilt.163 Nor will a defendant's mere acquies-
cence to the presence of contraband be a sufficient basis to say that
he or she possessed it, thus making it contraband as to him or
her. 41 6  In order to sustain a conviction, it is imperative that there
be some nexus or identifiable link beyond mere accessibility to the
transforming proximity to the drugs into the crime of 'possession' of those drugs seems
dangerous indeed." Id. at 699.
162. See United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 1407, 1411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court
in Johnson asserted that "constructive possession should not be lightly imputed to one
found in another's apartment or home." Id. at 1411. Under such circumstances, a
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate because mere proximity to a contraband or
association with an individual possessing an illegal substance will not satisfy the
requirements of constructive possession. Id. at 1412. See also Parker v. United States, 601
A.2d 45, 51 (D.C. 1991) (holding that although mere proximity to an illegal substance does
not prove knowledge plus dominion and control, where the "proximity 'is colored by
evidence linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of which that possession is a
part,'" the circumstances might very well give rise to an inference sufficient to sustain a
finding of possession); United States v. Di Novo, 523 F.2d 197, 201-02 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1016 (1975) (stating that even if she knew of her husband's possession of the
contraband found in their trailer, this was not deemed to be the type of "special
relationship" necessary to lead a fact finder to conclude that she also possessed it); People v.
Fusaro, 96 Cal. Rptr. 368, 377 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 912 (1972) (holding that mere
access or proximity to the contraband was not enough to constitute possession); State v.
Nesmith, 600 A.2d 780 (Conn. 1991) (Berdon, J., dissenting). Additional incriminating
circumstances "tending to buttress such an inference" of knowledge and control must be
demonstrated. Id. at 787. Mere presence in an area where the contraband is discovered,
although an evidentiary factor, is insufficient when the accused is not in the exclusive
possession of the premises. Id. Commonwealth v. Harris, 397 A.2d 424, 429 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979) ("[p]roving guilt by association is unacceptable."); State v. Olivarez, 820 P.2d 66, 67
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (having dominion and control over a location where drugs are found
is but one of the circumstances from which an inference of constructive possession may be
drawn). But see People v. Valenzuela, 345 P.2d 270 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). It should be
noted, however, that the fact that others may have an equal right of access to the
contraband, does not necessarily negate the finding of joint possession. Id. at 272.
163. Commonwealth v. Aviles, No. 1650, 1991 WL 285792, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan.
13, 1992). The issue in Aviles was whether possession was sufficiently established by virtue
of an affirmative showing that the appellant was the primary tenant of a house, because she
was present at the time of the police search and because the rooms in which the narcotics
were discovered were unlocked. Id. at *2.
164. City of Wahpeton v. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d 215, 217 (N.D. 1991). Wilkie appealed
from a conviction of possession of alcohol by a minor. Id. at 216. On the evening leading up
to his arrest, Wilkie's roommate, Kessler, was having a party in the apartment shared by
both of them. Id. Invited guests at the party were consuming alcoholic beverages. Id.
Wilkie was absent at the time, but arrived at approximately 9:15 p.m. to find the on-going
party. Id. He complained to his roommate about the party, and 15 minutes later left the
apartment. Id. The party was still in force when Wilkie returned at approximately 2:30
a.m. Id. After again complaining to Kessler about the party, Wilkie went to his bedroom.
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drugs between a defendant and the contraband, thus making it
fair to sufficiently associate the defendant with it.' 65 Hence, in sit-
uations where possession is nonexclusive, there must be some addi-
tional independent evidence present to buttress the inference of
knowing possession, thereby distinguishing the conscious possessor
from the inadvertent guest.166
To sustain a conviction, an affirmative link must be established
between the defendant and the controlled substance-not merely
a link to the area where the prohibited substance was found.' 67
That link must be established by independent facts and circum-
stances from which a jury may infer that the accused exercised
control. 6 1 This means that in a situation where joint possession is
contemplated, there must be sufficiently independent evidence to
support a finding of possession as to each defendant. 69 Absent
such additional and independent proof, narcotics possession
becomes either a crime of strict liability or a diminished burden of
proof for the state. 170
Id. A short time later, the police arrived to discover minors present. Id. Wilkie was
subsequently arrested for possession. Id.
The city contended that the element of dominion and control was established by virtue
of the fact that Wilkie was a co-renter. Wilkie, 477 N.W.2d at 217. The court held that
Wilkie was not in constructive possession of the alcohol merely because he was present in
his own apartment. Id. Constructive possession may not be established by mere presence
in a location or proximity to an illegal substance without an additional link between the
defendant and the alcohol. Id. The court added that even if the defendant acquiesced to
the consumption of alcohol by others, this fact did not provide an inference of an intent to
possess or an exercise of control over the alcohol. Id. at 218.
165. See United States v. Caspers, 736 F.2d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1984) (requiring
independent proof making it fair to connect the defendant to the contraband); Bailey v.
State, 821 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ark. 1991) (holding that joint occupancy of a residence alone is not
enough to establish joint possession; there must be an additional factor linking the accused
to the drugs); Petty v. People, 447 P.2d 217, 220 (Colo. 1968) (concluding that a conviction
of joint possession of marijuana cannot be sustained by a mere showing that the defendant
had been in the company of one having actual possession of the substance, without an
additional, independent link connecting it to him); Pier v. State, 400 N.E.2d 209, 211-12
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (although an accused's presence in the area where narcotics are
discovered tends to establish that he or she has the capability of exercising dominion and
control over the substance, it cannot be inferred therefrom that there was knowledge of its
presence and control over the drugs, absent additional incriminating evidence).
166. See United States v. Holland, 445 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Although the accused
knew about the presence of the narcotics, and even though narcotics were used in the
presence of the defendant, more is required before it can be said that the defendant
possessed the substance himself. Id. at 703.
167. Id. at 703. Appellant was jointly indicted after he was found undressed in a
bedroom where narcotics were discovered. Id. at 702. When asked to get dressed, he
removed clothing from a dresser in the bedroom, suggesting more than a fortuitous visit to
the home. Id. The court stated that constructive possession will not be lightly imputed to
one merely found in another's apartment or home. Id. at 703.
168. Id. at 703.
169. Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641, 642 (9th Cir. 1964). Even where there is
no doubt that at least one of two defendants, and perhaps both, possessed the drug, pure
speculation as to whether the possession was joint will not suffice. Id.
170. See generally King, supra note 5, at 711.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A conviction for possession of controlled substances in North
Dakota may be founded upon either actual or constructive posses-
sion. Either can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Actual possession, the literal, physical control of an item, poses lit-
tle difficulty. Constructive possession, a legal fiction used by courts
to impose criminal liability in situations where there is no actual
possession, continues to be the subject of much debate and confu-
sion. The hallmark of constructive possession is an evidentiary
showing by the state that the accused had some measure of domin-
ion and control over the contraband. This measure of dominion
and control can be present in the right or ability to exercise the
same. It is crucial to recognize that elements of dominion and
control alone cannot establish guilt in North Dakota. Logic and
justice mandate that the state establish the existence of some
degree of knowledge contemporaneously with the elements of
dominion and control.
The analysis under the constructive possession doctrine is nec-
essarily fact-driven. As no one evidentiary factor standing alone is
conclusively demonstrative, it must be inferred from the totality of
circumstances of a particular case.
Joint constructive possession may be found when illegal nar-
cotics are discovered in an area of equal access. Hence, joint crim-
inal liability can be imposed even if the evidence calls for a
conclusion whereby the accused are said to have possessed the
same item simultaneously. The analysis in cases in which joint pos-
session is at issue mandates the most exacting scrutiny. Absent
other incriminating evidence, possession cannot be established by
virtue of the fact that the defendant has been in the company of
one who has a narcotic on his or her person or is present in an area
where narcotics are found. Independent evidence that links each
defendant to the contraband must be presented in order to sustain
a conviction for joint possession.
As North Dakota's criminal possession statute has been
recently amended to include the mens rea requirement of "will-
fully," it is a foregone conclusion that some degree of knowledge
must now be proven by the prosecution as an independent ele-
ment of the offense.' The defendant in a criminal proceeding
171. A caveat of significant import should be noted. It is at least arguable that the
North Dakota Legislature has still not completely solved the mens rea dilemma of the
troublesome possession statute. The 1989 reenactment of section 19-03.1-23, which
amended the possession statute by inserting the mens rea requirement of "willfully," is
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will no longer be required to bear the burden of providing lack of
knowledge, or unwitting possession, as an affirmative defense to
escape the imposition of a criminal sentence. North Dakota courts
have not yet had an opportunity to articulate the exact extent of
knowledge which must be proven as a prerequisite to a finding of
guilt. The majority view requires independent proof that an
accused have knowledge of both the contraband's presence and its
forbidden nature in order to sustain a conviction. This is the bet-
ter approach because it not only safeguards the mens rea require-
ment as an element of the offense, which logic and policy require,
but provides a rational and just basis for the imposition of criminal
liability. 172
George H. Singer
itself conceptually problematic. The source of the potential problem emanates from the
statutory definition of "willfully." The North Dakota Century Code defines "willfully" as
that conduct which is intentional, knowing, or reckless. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-
02(lXe) (1985).
The requirement that the state prove the act of possession was knowing or intentional,
mandates a detailed examination into whether an accused actually exercised, or had a right
to exercise, a conscious dominion and control over that substance which the law proscribes.
However, within the context of possession of controlled substances in North Dakota, a
conviction for possession may be obtained on a conceivably diminished requirement of
knowledge in that conduct which is merely reckless may readily serve the basis for the
imposition of criminal liability. Reckless conduct has been defined as a "conscious ...
disregard.., of the existence of the relevant facts or risks,..." so as to be "a gross deviation
from acceptable standards of conduct .. ." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(lXc) (1985).
Although some degree of knowledge is a necessary element of recklessness, one need only
be aware that his or her conduct might cause a certain result. WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.7(f), at 239 (2d ed. 1986). Hence, while the
culpability of "knowingly" and "intentionally," as set forth in section 12.1-02-02, "require a
consciousness of almost-certainty, recklessness requires a consciousness of something far less
than certainty or even probability." Id. at 239-40.
It seems doubtful that the North Dakota Legislature envisioned or intended a result
which permitted the imposition of criminal sanctions for the possession of controlled
substances absent a culpability requirement which evinces a conscious-knowing possession.
The North Dakota Legislature should amend section 19-03.1-23, thereby returning to its
original promulgation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, by deleting the mens rea
requirement of "willfully" and substituting the requirements of "knowingly" and
"intentionally." In addition to preserving the knowledge requirement as an independent
element of the offense, proof of knowing and intentional possession will operate as a
realistic check on the obscure doctrine of contructive possession. See generally King, supra
note 5, at 715.
172. See generally King, supra note 5, at 715.

